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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that many of the official attempts to “integrate” the urban informal economy into the 
mainstream economy are fundamentally flawed. An unpacking of the “integrative” agenda as pursued by 
planning and other governmental practices reveals that “integration”, as currently practiced, does not herald 
the mainstreaming of the informal economy. Drawing on research in Zimbabwe and evidence from other 
countries in southern Africa, I argue that what we witness is a sinister stripping away of the lifeblood of 
informality. This malicious form of integration entails crippling Faustian bargains. In the end, this 
pernicious assimilation insidiously does away with that which makes informality a livelihood haven for the 
majority of urbanites. I conclude that the duplicitous integration is unworkable and leaves the big questions 
of inclusion untouched, hence the persistence of the “problem” of informality. 
Keywords: informality; governmentality; planning; inclusion; integration; Zimbabwe; southern Africa 
Introduction 
Prescriptions on dealing with the “informal sector” in the global South include calls to 
“mainstream” it into spatial planning—a prelude to the integration and inclusion of informality into the 
urban system (Mwenechanya, 2007; UN-Habitat, 2006; 2009). There is no shortage of proposals on how 
this can be accomplished. The perceived advantages of integration abound. Among other things, 
integration will help embattled informals benefit from their status as citizens (Kamete, 2011; Tripp, 
1997); it will contribute to public coffers; and it will improve the gathering and processing of economic 
data (Henley et al., 2006; Hussmanns, 2004). These are persuasive arguments. However, this study 
suggests that there are cases where in practice, stripped of their beneficent veneer, actual governmental 
practices to integrate the informal sector seem to have a sinister, dark side. 
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In this article, I argue that some official moves to integrate the urban informal economy in 
southern Africa are in a way fundamentally flawed, if not pernicious. While on the surface they appear 
to be promising, it appears that they by no means herald the “mainstreaming” of the informal economy 
into the urban planning system and thence the urban economy. I question claims of mainstreaming, 
suggesting that what we witness might be a relentless stripping away of the soul of informality. 
Sometimes the integration involves crippling Faustian bargains: shedding key traits—the very 
lifeblood—of informality and mimicking those of formality. 
In the end, with regards to space and place, it could be concluded that this is a form of pernicious 
assimilation that takes away that which makes informality an accessible livelihood option for the majority 
of urbanites. If they followed the letter of the conditions of integration, the vast majority of the integrated 
informals would not make it. Based on a study of integration in urban Zimbabwe, I argue that the state-
orchestrated integration leaves the big questions of real inclusion untouched, hence the persistence of the 
“problem” of informality. 
This paper makes three key contributions to debates on urban informality and planning. First, at 
a theoretical level, it extends the debates by reframing the practice of integration as an expression of 
governmental rationality and situating informality within the general problem of “government” 
(Foucault, 2007). At empirical level, it brings insights from original ethnographic data to shed some light 
on specific contextual realities by not only uncovering integration in action, but also peering into the 
experiences of various actors on different sides of integration, namely, those doing the integration and 
those being integrated. At a policy/practice level, by using the term ‘pernicious integration’, the paper 
explicitly questions what has been considered as a panacea for the exclusion of informality: integrating 
it into the mainstream economy, by for example, providing new markets (UN-Habitat, 2006; Tokman, 
2007; Agyei-Mensah and Owusu, 2010; Adaawen and Jørgensen, 2012). 
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows: After the introduction, I will sketch out a framework 
for analysis where I situate informality within the general problem of “government” seen as the “conduct 
of conduct”. I will then provide a background to the study and go on to scrutinize “integration” in urban 
Zimbabwe. This will be followed by highlights of cases of pernicious integration in other parts of 
southern Africa. In the penultimate section, I will cast a critical gaze at the statist version of integration.   
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Integration as Government 
The integration of the informal economy is widely seen as an important step towards inclusive 
urban policy (UN-Habitat, 2006, 2009).  For example, UN-Habitat (2006) discusses the integration of 
the informal economy into national accounts, the social security system, the policy-making process, the 
formulation of legislation, as well as the formal legal system and city-plans. Tokman (2007) considers 
the integration of the informal sector into the regulatory system, the modernization process, the modern 
sector, and the taxation system. Evidently, integration means a lot and involves a lot. Whatever its 
meaning, style and activities in any particular context in time and space, as its proponents argue, 
integration has the potential to achieve a lot of good.  
At its root, the integration of the informal economy is “an attempt to change human conduct by 
calculated means” (Li, 2007, 5). As such, this “inclusion” of informality belongs to practices of 
“government” where such practices are “deliberate attempts to shape conduct in certain ways in relation 
to certain objectives” (Rose, 1999, 4). For this reason, I will frame specific practices of integration 
through the Foucauldian analytics of governmentality (Foucault, 2000a). Governmentality is the “art of 
government” (Foucault, 2000a). It refers to the “rationalities and mentalities of governance and the range 
of tactics and strategies that produce social order” (Merry, 2001, 18). The state’s relationship to 
informality is embedded in this art of government. The relationship reflects the challenge of governing a 
sector that is seen as operating outside the state’s regulatory framework (Lindell, 2010). That is why the 
government of informality cannot be separated from the regulation of conduct––what Foucault terms the 
“guiding of the possibility of conduct” (1983, 221). This “conduct of conduct” (Foucault, 2000b, 341) to 
achieve desired objectives is what governmentality is all about (Huxley, 2007).  
Governmentality has three axes: political rationalities, technologies of government, and the 
making of subjects (Inda 2005; Rose and Miller, 1992). Political rationalities are “the political reasons, 
... intellectual machineries that render reality thinkable in such a manner as to make it calculable and 
governable” (Inda, 2005, 7). As systems of thought and intellectual machineries, political rationalities 
have a moral form, an epistemological character and a distinctive idiom (Rose and Miller, 1992). The 
moral form is concerned with the ideals and principles towards which government should be directed 
(Rose and Miller, 1992, 178-179). The epistemological character sees political rationalities being 
“articulated in relation to some conception of the nature of the objects governed” (Rose and Miller, 1992, 
179). The distinctive idiom of political rationalities is about the language that constitutes political 
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discourse which, as argued by Rose and Miller (1992, 179), is more than rhetorical. Deploying Rose and 
Miller’s conceptualization in the study of informality helps us to prize open the thinking and 
rationalization behind the integration of informality. In the handling of informality discussed in this 
article, it is this rationality that is translated into a programmatic form consisting of strategies and 
procedures of integration. 
Technologies of government comprise a multiplicity of practical mechanisms that render 
programmes operable (Rose and Miller, 1992, 183), thereby actualising the political reasons discussed 
above. As articulated by Inda (2005, 9), the technological “is that domain of practical mechanisms, 
devices, calculations, procedures [and] apparatuses” that are deployed in the attempt to shape conduct by 
calculated means (Li, 2007, 3). As the programmatic form of political rationalities, technologies of 
government comprise a “complex of techniques, instruments, measures, and programs that endeavours 
to translate thought into practice and thus actualize political reasons” (Inda, 2005, 9). 
It is through these technologies of government that “authorities of various sorts have sought to 
shape, normalize and instrumentalize the conduct, thought, decisions and aspirations of others in order 
to achieve the objectives they consider desirable” (Miller and Rose, 1990, 8). In a way, the handling of 
informality, including strategies of integration is a reflection of “the deliberations, strategies, tactics and 
devices employed by authorities for making up and acting upon a population and its constituents to ensure 
good and avert ill” (Rose 1996, 328; my emphasis). The challenge is to decipher what the authorities 
perceive to be the “good” that has to be ensured and what they consider to be the “evil” that has to be 
averted. These are the matters that we need to peer into when we deconstruct state-directed policies and 
strategies to “facilitate” the informal sector (Tripp, 1997, 12) through integration or inclusion. 
As regards the making of subjects, governmental practices and programmes seek to cultivate 
particular types of individual and collective identity as well as forms of agency and subjectivity (Inda, 
2005, 10). Needless to say, government is intimately involved in making modern subjects: citizens, 
business people, consumers, workers and so on. Thus, when the state tries to make informals behave in 
certain ways, such as operating from a fixed spot without roving the city, it is actually making up subjects 
who fit into the state’s conception and mould of responsible citizenship and orderly business behaviour 
that is compatible with their vision of the modern city (Kamete, 2013a). 
 5 
Before looking at integration on the ground, it is helpful to consider the neutral, uncoloured and 
“unlocalised” definition.  According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (Integration, 1989) 
“integration” is “the bringing into equal membership of a common society those groups or persons 
previously discriminated against”.  Integration then is about the cessation of discrimination, the 
bestowing of equal status. As a verb, to “integrate”, as defined by the Cambridge Advanced Lerner’s 
Dictionary (CALD) can mean either of two things. The first one involves people and is viewed from the 
perspective of the one being integrated. It entails mixing with and joining a group “often changing to suit 
their way of life, habits and customs” (Integrate, 2008, 751). The second sense is about things and 
involves the combining of “two or more things in order to become more effective” (Integrate, 2008, 751). 
As I will argue below, in Zimbabwe’s state-directed practices aimed at the government of informality, 
integration is a complex phenomenon. As a noun, it does not satisfy the OED definition. As a verb, it 
straddles both senses in the CALD definition: It is ostensibly done with the second sense in mind but 
often entails the first sense. This is what makes this form of state-initiated integration potentially 
pernicious. 
Perspectives on and the Government of Informality 
To understand and interpret informality, it is important to examine dominant perspectives on 
informality and the authorities’ responses to it.1 Here I will briefly look at the three that could be deployed 
in southern African cities and towns. The first one is the modernisation perspective. This longstanding 
perspective regards informality as a pre-modern phenomenon. As such, the informal sector is a residue, 
a leftover from a backward pre-modern period (Williams and Gurtoo, 2012). In the modernisation 
perspective, the formal economy is the embodiment of progress. True to the precepts of modernisation 
theory, the perspective holds that the inevitable trajectory of development will see the replacement of 
informal enterprises with tangible manifestations of urban modernity such as shopping complexes. 
Informality, with its disorderliness, inefficiencies and parasitic tendencies will (or has to?) disappear (see 
Bromley, 2007). In much of southern Africa, this perspective has taken a normative and programmatic 
dimension. Many authorities and bureaucrats associate informality with backwardness and disorder. 
Unsurprisingly they are obsessed with urban modernity (Kamete, 2013). They are convinced that the 
backward sector has to disappear because according to them, it is a pathology that is “both undesirable 
and illegal” (UN-Habitat 2009, xxvi; Kamete, 2013b). Over the years, they have attempted to get rid of 
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informality and attain the desired modern city through strategies involving outright eradication, de-
informalization and formalization (see Kamete, 2013a).  
The other dominant perspective is the structuralist one. Rooted in political economy, this 
perspective views informality as a “necessity-driven activity” (Williams and Lansky, 2012, 394). 
Necessity here may be seen from two angles. First, the operators are forced into the informal sector 
because there is no livelihood alternative (Williams and Gurtoo, 2012, 394).  Second, instead of being a 
remnant of pre-modern backwardness, “informality is part and parcel of the processes of modernization” 
(Fernandez-Kelly, 2006, 18); it plays an important part in the accumulation practices of modern 
economies (Williams and Lansky, 2013, 363). This perspective thus usefully distinguishes between “a 
survivalist informal sector” that operates at the margins of the modern formal economy, and a “productive 
informal sector” which is an integral component of capitalist accumulation (Bhattacharya, 2007, 6). This 
political economy approach suggests that there is (or should be) no one-dimensional response to 
informality. Whether governmental practices seek to eradicate, de-informalize, formalize or even ignore 
informality (see Kamete, 2013a), depends on the dominant view of particular informalities in given 
contexts at given times.  
The neoliberal perspective argues that informality is a manifestation of rational choice, not a 
consequence of the absence of livelihood alternatives (Perry et al, 2007). Informal sector operators and 
workers have voluntarily exited the overregulated and costly formal economy (Becker, 2004) in pursuit 
of the “autonomy, flexibility and freedom” that is found in the formal sector (Williams and Lansky, 2013, 
364). Escaping from the burdensome controls of the formal economy such as taxes, licences, registration, 
planning regulations, and public health codes are some of the reasons why people voluntarily exit the 
formal economy (Kamete, 2004; see Nwazugbor 2005; Perry et al, 2007). In terms of a response, the 
authorities address this haemorrhaging of the formal economy by typical neoliberal remedies that revolve 
around the removal of bureaucratic controls and rolling back the state. Liberalization, deregulation and 
privatisation are some of the favoured policies. The goal is to (re)formalise the disenchanted 
entrepreneurs and keep those who are in the formal economy from exiting. 
Considering urban contexts in much of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), it can be argued that most of 
the informality is not a result of people voluntarily exiting the formal economy. It is taken up by people 
driven by necessity. They have no access to state benefits or have been “excluded from … the circuits of 
the modern economy” (Perry et al, 2007, 1). In SSA, 53 per cent of non-agricultural employment is in 
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the informal economy (ILO, 2013, 7). The people working here are among the multitude who live in 
urban areas with limited wage employment opportunities in a restricted, dwindling or underperforming 
formal economy––this in the absence of welfare benefits. These people find themselves offloaded onto 
the only livelihood alternative available: informality. Little wonder then that the authorities’ dominant 
responses to informality are de-informalization, formalization, eradication, dislocation or doing nothing2 
(see Kamete, 2013a).   
Integrating Informality in Urban Zimbabwe 
The Study  
In the rest of this paper, I will analyse real-life integration in Harare, Zimbabwe. This analysis is 
based on a qualitative study comprising semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats and activists as well 
as two focus group discussions with informal sector operators in Harare in 2010 (see Table 1). The study 
sought to garner perspectives on the what, why, how and experience of integration. My focus was on the 
spatial aspects of integration, hence the preponderance of planners among the bureaucrats.  
Table 1.  Profile of study participants 
Pseudonym    Details    Interview date 
PLANNERS   
Mr A Local government 19 August 2010 
Mr B Local government 19 August 2010 
Ms C Consultant 23 August 2010 
Ms D Central government 24 August 2010 
Mr E Central government 26 August 2010 
Mr F Local government 31 August 2010 
   
OTHER BUREAUCRATS   
Mr G Economist 17 August 2010 
Ms H Accountant 22 August 2010 
Mr K Social worker 23 August 2010 
Mr L Civil Engineer 23 August 2010 
Mrs M Legal officer 24 August  2010 
Mr N ‘Very senior’ official  (MLGRUD) 30 August 2010 
Mrs P ‘Very senior’ official (MSMED) 30 August 2010 
   
ACTIVISTS   
Ms Q Youth 31 August 2010 
Ms R Informal Traders 31 August 2010 
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Mr S Land and Housing 31 August 2010 
Mr T Black Economic Empowerment 1 September 2010 
Ms U Gender 1 September 2010 
   
INFORMAL WORKERS    
Chamu Male, 20 years old  10 August 2010 
Mary Female, 26 years old 10 August 2010 
Moyo Male, 33 years old 10 August 2010 
Tino Male, 25 years old 10 August 2010 
Baba Kundi Male, 31 years old 10 August 2010 
Mukai Female, 26 years old 11 August 2010 
Ranga Female, 19 years old 11 August 2010 
Mai  Joe Female 29 years old 11 August 2010 
Rati Female, 24 years old 11 August 2010 
Pepukai Female, 22 years old 11 August 2010 
Jimmy Male, 27 years old 11 August 2010 
The bureaucrats included two long-serving “very senior” central government officials involved 
with policy making in two key ministries: The Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprise Development 
(MSMED), and the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD). The 
informality studied here belongs to the category that Bhattacharya (2007, 6) describes as “the purely 
marginalized or survivalist urban informal sector”.  The participants are among the multitudes driven by 
necessity to eke a living in the informal economy. 
Background 
At the turn of the century, Zimbabwe started experiencing what commentators have labelled a 
crisis of governance (Kamete, 2010). The crisis is blamed for the political and economic problems that 
were plaguing the country at the time of the study (Bond and Manyanya, 2002). The economy had been 
in free-fall since 2000. By 2005, unemployment was estimated at an unprecedented 70%; and 80% of the 
population lived below the poverty threshold (IMF, 2005). The erosion of incomes and the dwindling 
prospects of (formal sector) employment contributed to a situation where two in five urbanites were 
involved in the informal economy ((IMF, 2005). 
The hostile political and economic conditions directly impacted on livelihoods. The economic meltdown 
drove an increasing stream of urbanites into informal livelihood practices. At the time of the study, the 
prospect of employment in the formal economy was remote. Further, the few available jobs did not pay 
enough to stave off poverty, hence the flooding of the informal economy even by the formally employed. 
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The social and political situation made operating in the informal economy a risky enterprise. As the 
economy collapsed, the informal economy was routinely blamed for sabotaging the national economy 
(Gono, 2005). This accusation led up to Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order (OM/RO), the world 
(in)famous 2005 urban clean-up operation. OM/RO was targeted at what the authorities labelled as 
“filth”. In just two months, the colossal operation almost decimated informality (Kamete 2009). The 
authorities’ readiness to use violence to impose and enforce their version of order made involvement in 
the informal economy a risky affair. The perception of urban centres as strongholds of political 
opposition (Kamete, 2009) did not help either. 
The authorities’ war on informality is a war for contested urban spaces. In urban Zimbabwe, like 
elsewhere, different social groups attach different meanings, uses and values to space (Routledge, 1997, 
70).  These differences have generated various tensions and conflicts over the use of contested urban 
spaces. Faced with people who have persistently disrupted their version of order by disregarding planning 
regulations and controls, local authorities have regularly clamped down on informality, accusing 
informals of violating edicts on the ownership, occupation and use of land. The authorities’ weapon of 
choice has been planning. In enforcing the state’s version of order, planning has always enlisted the 
muscle of the local and national law-enforcement and security infrastructure to physically deal with 
stubborn informals (Kamete, 2008). Officially dubbed “clean-up operations”, attempts to restore order 
to urban spaces consist of raids, dislocation and/or relocation. These operations often involve physical 
assault, evictions, confiscation of merchandise, arrests, incarceration, and the exacting of fines (Kamete, 
2008). Also, at the time of the study undercover law-enforcement and state-security operatives conducted 
covert operations targeted at informality (Kamete, 2008).  
In addition to clean-up campaigns, the authorities have tried to use the carrot in the form of 
integration. Ostensibly aimed at “upgrading” informality, this consists of a composite process that is 
simultaneously formalisation and de-informalization (Kamete, 2013a). It consists of among other things 
licencing, registration, relocation, and the levying of rentals and user fees and charges. There have also 
been attempts at taxation (Dube, 2014). This “integration” of informality is the subject of this discussion.  
The Meaning of Integration 
The study first sought to gain insight into what various stakeholders understood by the “the 
integration of the informal sector”, “integrating the informal sector” and other variants of the term. The 
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intention was to get the sense of what the term and the practice meant to these people. I was not after a 
mere definition, but the meaning of the term and practice of integration. Most bureaucrats offered a 
technicist understanding. Mr F3, a local government planner, insisted that integration was about “bringing 
the informal sector into the regulatory framework”. To him that was the “meat of it, the very essence of 
integration”. All twelve bureaucrats referred to what Mr N, a “very senior” government official, termed 
“the expansion of civilised rules and regulations, codes and whatnot … [into] those dark murky waters 
of the informal [sector]” (Ms D, planner). Mrs M, a legal officer who at one time was a part-time tutor 
in planning law at the local university, insisted that “integration, inclusion, etc. etc., simply means 
regulating what has previously been unregulated”. To her, it was “all about bringing illicit businesses 
into the purview of the law, period”. 
From what he termed “a business perspective”, Mr G, an economist, stated that integration was 
about “some kind of entrepreneurial graduation … where informal units kind of become genuine business 
enterprises … sort of small-scale enterprises, if you want”. Mrs P, a “very senior official” in the MSMED 
endorsed this view, pointing out that integrating the informal sector meant “elevating these dark Dracula-
like operations from underground operations which no one knows and cares about to SMEs [Small and 
Medium-Size Enterprises] with a respectable legal corporate identity”. To Ms H, a local government 
accountant, this “upgrading is all about becoming bona fide business operations … operating in a lawful, 
free and fair manner with the real possibility of succeeding or failing and paying one’s dues”. 
Interestingly, ten of the thirteen bureaucrats equated integration with modernization. Mr A, a 
planner, asserted that it was about “integrating the backward sector into the modern decent economy”. 
Ms C was undoubtedly reflecting the majority opinion among professionals when she opined that to 
integrate was “to pluck the barbarian sector [sic] from destructive primitive habits to civilized business 
practices”. This is what Mr N, the senior civil servant dubbed “bringing stone-age business operations 
and their caveman businessmen [sic] from the Stone Age into the present modern age [by] modernising 
both the business and the people”. Closely related to this were statements reminiscent of the Zimbabwe’s 
clean-up campaigns including OM/RO which equated informality with filth. Mr E, a planner, referred to 
integration as a “sort of policy hygiene” that involved “scrubbing and cleansing up [sic]” the informal 
sector. Mr L, an engineer, averred that integration was a form of “sectoral pest control … for 
deverminizing the severely contaminated urban business sphere”. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, activists had a different understanding. To them, integration was about 
“finally embracing and accepting the informal sector” (Ms R, “livelihoods advocate”). Mr K, a social 
worker, understood integration as “converting vendors and hawkers from second-class citizens, who are 
routinely trampled on by the powers that be, to real citizens with full economic rights”. Reflecting this 
view, Ms Q, a youth worker, defined integration as “an act of ‘citizenization’, pure and simple”. Mr S, 
who works in the land and housing sector, provided some sort of bridging perspective. Integrating 
informality to him, is about  
Sensitive and sensible regulation … where you bring informality under regulations responsive to their 
needs, … where they become a special kind of recognized business with full rights and 
responsibilities; when finally vendors and street traders can have their labours and contributions 
acknowledged. 
What of the operators themselves? The study captured two understandings. The first one is a 
negative one, which sees integration as a ploy to destroy informality. Rati, a 24-year–old vendor, stressed 
that integration was “a government weapon to wipe out vendors, street traders and every poor person 
struggling to survive in the city”. Agreeing with this perspective, Baba Kundi (age 31), a motor mechanic 
at a home industry (see Kamete, 2004) stressed that integration was “a weapon for dragging us into 
senseless and dangerous laws … meant to destroy businesses of the poor so the rich and powerful can 
take over”. While sceptical, Jimmy, who constantly asked his colleagues “to give [the authorities] the 
benefit of the doubt”, interpreted integration as being about “promoting us the small people to real 
businesses, with all [the] benefits of loans, services and premises”. Mukai partly agreed with the part 
about integration being about promoting informal businesses to “what looks like respectable businesses” 
but quickly added that “the way this is done makes me smell a big fat rotten rat, and suspect that … 
[integration] equals eradication of our businesses”. She asked, “Why is it always about laws, relocation, 
taxes and rates?” Endorsing the scepticism of the majority, Chamu dismissed attempts to integrate 
informality as “a government scam” in which the state was the “sweet-talking satanic conman”.  
Reasons for Integration 
The second theme of the interviews was to understand what the interviewees regarded as the 
reasons for integrating informality. There was no consensus on the part of operators. The majority (9 out 
of 11) believed the main reason was that the authorities wanted to “make the poor disappear from town” 
[kuti varombo tishaikwe pataundi] (Mary). The most dominant basis for this perspective was that there 
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was too much emphasis on “obeying the law and paying a lot of taxes and fees and a lot of other stupid 
charges” (Mai Joe). Said Mukai,  
You can’t obey and pay and still have your business running. Obedience and payment is the end of 
you unless you have deep pockets and don’t care about survival. They know it and that’s why they 
do it, … to eliminate our businesses.  
Jimmy was more charitable. He pointed out that integrating the informal sector was meant to 
improve the lot of the people and make informal businesses “to become like those of white people”. This 
was fiercely challenged by Mr Moyo, who argued that if that was the intention, loans and other assistance 
would be the way to achieve it, not “tumitemo tusina maturo [pointless regulation] ruthless enforcement 
and crippling charges”. Ranga, in her first year at university, initially professed to be “objective and 
standing on the fence”, but quickly complained that the underlying motivation behind integration was  
all about kupfumisana [enriching each other], … not of every Tom and Jerry [sic] but enrichment of 
a few informal operators and many corrupt powerful people, mazitsotsi [thieves] who will step in 
when our so-called “dirty” businesses are wiped off the map. … [Integration] is about survival of the 
fittest [operators], plus theft, plus invasion by the rich and powerful.  
There was a feeling among some operators that whatever the reasons for integration, it had nothing to do 
with the “good of vendors and other small fish” (Rati). As Tino put it,  
The way this whole thing is being done shows that what these people are looking for is not about us, 
it’s about them. … Us, well, we are just pieces in a game that it is all about the big people. Nothing 
in this game has anything do with our prosperity and success. 
Activists were divided on the issue. While most doubted “the sincerity and charitability [sic]of 
the propagators of the concept” (Ms R), some did believe that there were in “some official quarters some 
good and practically sensible intentions” (Mr T).  Again referring to “citizenization”, Ms Q stressed that 
“the real original uncontaminated reason” for integrating and inclusion is to eradicate a two-tier 
citizenship system where one tier runs legal businesses and another one “is an outlaw and operates 
underground, in the dark, in perpetual fear”. Mr T, whose views were almost the same as Jimmy’s 
optimistic proclamations, mentioned the concept of “black empowerment”. To Mr T “lifting the 
marginalized black man [sic] from the rubbish dump of informality is what government is looking to do 
when they ask people to register businesses, get licences and move to proper premises”. An interesting 
dimension, raised by two activists was the distinction between the “theory” and the “practice” of 
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integrating informality. Ms U, a gender activist, insisted that as far as “women vendors” were concerned 
“the so-called integration is an angelic concept with a satanic intent. … Behind the heavenly front is a 
hellish backstage where good intentions are replaced with heinous plans painted in beautiful colours”. 
The “satanic” intention was to “bring an end to vending, street trading, cross-border trading and home-
based industries.” According to Mr S, “bringing informality into the mainstream” was driven by the 
desire “to stop poor people from practicing businesses [sic] that break the law; but the actualization of 
this plan shows some deadly ulterior motives, ... a conspiracy to completely destroy some survival 
practices”. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the bureaucrats gave technical explanations. These revolved around four 
reasons: order, modernization, eliminating freeriding and facilitating surveillance. Of the thirteen, eleven 
(84%) cited the need for order as the “primary reason” for integrating informality. Mr B talked of 
“bringing sanity to chaos-ville” a comment that Mr F endorsed when he talked about “taming the wild-
wild west created by the willy-nilly informal sector [sic].” In Ms D’s view, “inclusion is necessitated by 
the need to terminate urban disorder by parasitic unproductive pseudo businesses”. Mr N was explicit 
about the need for planned urban spaces, pointing out that integration was driven by the realisation that 
“planned cities are orderly cities and everyone, formal, informal and whatnot should be part of the 
crusade. … So the informal sector has to be roped in through inclusion”. Three in four of the bureaucrats 
believed that one of the key purposes of integrating or mainstreaming informality was to get rid of free 
riders. In Mr G’s view, “if you operate a business you have to pay your dues”. Ms D stressed that “the 
driving force behind bringing the informal sector into the mainstream is to ensure that they pay for the 
privilege of benefiting from the conducive environment funded by the taxpayer.” According to Mrs M, 
the “ultimate philosophy” behind integration was: “You can’t benefit from the blood, sweat and tears of 
others [taxpayers] without contributing something.” Asked whether fundraising was the motivating 
factor, Ms C retorted, “Call it what you may, but in the city everyone should pull their weight.”   
All but one of the bureaucrats linked integration to the creation of a modern economy. According 
to Mr N, the informal sector is a “backward sector in urgent need of modernization, hence integration”. 
Passionately outlining what he said were the “chief motivations” for integration, Mr A said that it was 
“inconceivable to have a pre-colonial economy in a post-colonial city”. To him, this was “the long and 
short of bringing in all businesses into a common regulatory framework”. Mrs P insisted that “the 
recognition that the backward sector has to be upgraded” was the main reason for integration. 
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Modernising a seemingly backward sector was evidently what Mr G was hinting at when he said that 
informality was “the archaic economy version X which has to be upgraded to a modern economy version 
X10”. Seven of the 13 bureaucrats cited surveillance as a motive for integration. Both Mrs M and Mr L 
stressed the need to “monitor the underground economy” as one of the reasons for “bringing it into the 
mainstream” (Mr L) where “it could be watched closely, like everything else in the urban sphere” (Ms 
M). According to Mr D, “planning does not like dead ground and dark corners; everything has to be 
transparent that is why everything has to be under the same transparent umbrella”. Mr E maintained that 
“effective urban management depended on seeing, counting, quantifying and calculating”. Counting and 
calculating was what Ms H said was the reason for integration. She pointed out,  
We need full and comprehensive data for effective decision-making and planning. Everything and 
everyone needs to be enumerated. The prerequisite to accurate counting is visibility. You count what 
you see … so what cannot be counted or does not want to be counted has to be dug up and brought 
into the light, … into the mainstream. That is the “why” of integration. 
Alluding to this, Ms C intimated that integrating the informal sector was “essential for effective decision 
support systems, where everything that should be seen can be seen when those who want to see it can go 
out to see it so that they can factor it into a proper decision-making and planning framework”.   
Technologies of Integration 
This part of the study focused on the actual practice of integration: how exactly the authorities go 
about integrating informality. Observations and interviews revealed that the main methods of integration 
are all technical and legal and revolve around regulation with special emphasis on “modernization”, 
planning controls and finance. Specific methods include registration and licensing, relocation and 
containment, levying taxes and other charges as well as various monitoring and surveillance practices. 
Perhaps the most conspicuous practices have to do with registration and licences.4 It involves 
payment of requisite fees and “other nominal charges associated with the documentation process” (Ms 
H). Integration implied recognition; recognition meant being known, which in turn meant “being legit 
with a legal identity bestowing a kind of individuality and accountability on the business entity” (Mrs P). 
As put by Mr G, “You can’t exist without announcing your existence and making your identity known. 
Registration and licensing is that crucial announcement that you are there and you have a right to exist.” 
Registration and licensing were thus the “crucial first stage for inclusion and integration” (Ms D), 
something akin to a “rebirth into a new life—a legal existence” (Mrs M). According to Mrs P, 
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accomplishing these processes translates to “legalization and regularization … the critical prerequisites 
[sic] to integration.” To underline the importance of registration and licensing there is “a strong police 
dimension to it” with the Licensing Inspectorate of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) “prowling city 
spaces to ensure that those who operate businesses are truly legit and to flush out illegal elements” (Mr 
G). 
As Mr A reminded me, “it should be noted that integration is not automatic”. The application, 
which costs more than a week’s earnings for the units studied, can be rejected. Two of the operators in 
the study had their applications turned down. Pointing out that “integration does not mean the end of 
gate-keeping”, Ms H stressed that “there are always leftovers that cannot be integrated”. According to 
Mr G, they are  
the unavoidable masese [dregs] in the process: the parasitic ones from which the rest of the urban 
system has to be protected, … the ones with no potential to add value to the system, … from whom 
real compliant business have to be protected. 
The satisfaction of this crucial first step effectively brings the individualized qualifying units 
within the “ambit of the regulatory framework” (Mr B). This is when the planning and financial aspects 
“start to kick in” (Mr E). First to “kick in” is the imposition of order in urban spaces where the business 
units operate. As put by Mr F, “the acquisition of a licence should not be misconstrued as a green light 
to operate willy-nilly. It is a contract to abide by the statutory and regulatory framework”. Operating 
licence and planning permission are “two separate requirements, where one does not imply the other” 
(Ms D). The licence is about being allowed to exist as a business entity; planning and leases are about 
acquiring permission to occupy and operate in particular spaces and to carry out particular practices 
(uses).  This is an aspect that activists still failed to grasp five years after OM/RO (see Kamete, 2007). 
When it was explained to them Ms Q labelled it as “a totally unnecessary hurdle, … total persecution”, 
while Mr T dismissed it as a “spurious gate-keeping exercise meted on businesses [sic] that are now 
legal”. 
Having gained legal existence, the units have to fulfil a two-step requirement: occupation and 
use. First, the operators have to operate in an area they have a right to occupy.  Save for those operating 
home-based industries, for most of them it means obtaining legal leases. Whether on the shop front, the 
streets, public open-spaces or public transport termini, a lease is needed to “sort of cement legality” (Ms 
D). For most of these places, the property owner is the city council. As the “legal the landlord [sic]” 
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council can specify, through spatial planning, “where space for particular uses is designated” (Ms D). 
The second step is to use the spaces for the purposed designated by the planning system. In most cases, 
this means relocating to appropriately plan and designated areas. As Mr A legalistically put it, like 
licensing, 
Occupation does not mean you can do anything that comes into your head or appears attractive. You 
have to stick to the use class for that piece of land. Use and occupation are two things. One is a 
property rights issue, the other is a planning issue. 
This planning requirement has frequently resulted in the forced relocation of the integrated 
businesses to planned spaces designated for the appropriate use: be it vegetable and fruit vending, second-
hand clothes, trading, cooked food vending, services, carpentry, vehicle repairs, building materials 
selling, and so on. Mai Joe, Tino and Rati had been moved from a local public transport terminus and 
shopping centre to a “People’s Market”. Mary and Mr Moyo had been relocated from the streets to a 
disused city council car park. According to Mr A, the relocation means “settlement and fixity [sic] and 
the end of wandering around from place to place like Maasai herders”. According to Mr A, to “realize 
orderliness on abused urban land parcels”, the integrated businesses have to give up the social space of 
informality as they are forced to move into the abstract spaces of planned markets and home industries 
(see Lefebvre, 1991). For ambulant vendors such as Pepukai and Mary, integration entails having a fixed 
market stall and conducting their business from there. Instead of moving around looking for customers, 
the customers have to come to them, and in some cases find them among the hundreds of traders in the 
designated market or home industry. When asked about this, Mr E triumphantly declared that relocation 
to properly designated sites “means that finally the natural order is achieved: Muhammad has to go to 
the mountain instead of vice versa [sic]”. 
Once the operators are in the planned spaces, visibility is attained and enumeration can be 
undertaken. This in turn makes it possible to levy a variety of charges on the operators. Where defaults 
and deviances are noted, appropriate penalties can be exacted. As noted by quite a few participants in the 
study, integration heralds the end of free riding. Apart from the rent, the operators may also be required 
to pay for infrastructure, utilities and other services.5 According to Mr L, integration entails 
the elimination of free riding and shameless leeching. The [integrated] businesses have to fork out 
something for land, services and the infrastructure they depreciate [sic] and that other responsible 
citizens have been shouldering for them. With this process, parasites become an endangered species.  
 17 
At the time of the study, there was no income or corporate tax on the operators and their businesses. A 
senior civil servant said that licensing and leasing of premises was an important “step towards 
transparency and visibility” which in turn was “a big step to eventual taxation when the informal sector 
is finally brought into the tax net” (Mrs P). Now that the businesses “could be seen and counted, the 
accounting logistics would be worked out and the informal sector would be fully integrated” (Mr G) and 
“tax avoidance and tax evasion in the sector will be the exception rather than the norm” (Ms H).6 Mr G 
hastened to point out that this would be “a win-win scenario [because] the informal sector will benefit 
from advantages like VAT and duty exemptions and reductions and so on”. 
Making Subjects: Sketching the Outcomes 
This part is a brief overview of the experience of integration by the operators. Eleven operators 
participated in the study (Table 1). Table 2 summarizes their experiences. It is clear from Table 2 that 
the “initial uptake … [of integration] is always extremely very good [sic]” (Mr G). However, in this case, 
what Mrs P called the “worrying desertion rate” was high. For example, six out of the eight operators 
who had been “integrated” deserted the planned spaces, all within the first six months. The case of Chamu 
is instructive. Previously an ambulant trader in the city centre, Chamu had registered his business in June 
2010. He successfully got his hawker’s licence. The authorities required him to move to a designated 
People’s Market at Charge Office, a public bus terminus near Harare Central Police Station. He had to 
“settle down” (stop being a mobile vendor) as part of the terms of his licence.  He paid US$20 for what 
he termed “a mere patch of paved ground” less than two square meters in size. The site was overcrowded 
and Chamu’s business “was invisible … drowning [kutonyura chaiko] among masses of other small 
vendors”. From an average US$3 a day, his takings plummeted to less than US$5 a week. Unable to 
“stand the pain, loss and embarrassment anymore”, Chamu abandoned his new business place and 
returned to his “former way of life” in the city centre before the end of July of the same year. 
Table 2. Operators’ experience of integration 
Operator “Integrated” Moved out Stayed Resisted Never “integrated” 
Chamu      
Mary      
Moyo      
Tino      
Baba Kundi      
Mukai      
Ranga      
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Mai  Joe      
Rati      
Pepukai      
Jimmy      
Total 8 6 2 2 1 
Source: Based on field work, 2010 
Pepukai, a peripatetic trader whose clients were all over the CBD and residential areas, resisted 
“the stupid games” of integration. She did register her business “to have protection against harassment 
and extortion”. What she resisted was the mandatory relocation. She never allowed her business to be 
contained on one site, which was what that the bureaucrats at the city council advised her. Rati, never 
bothered to register, and needless to say, continued trading on the streets and shopping centres. Jimmy 
was what Ms Q called a “special case”. He would have loved to register; but did not have the money and 
so never managed to acquire the all-important licence. He still harboured hopes of one day registering 
and getting a stall at the officially designated sites. As he told me, he longed for the day when he would 
tell his ailing mother: “Tapinda, tapinda” [We are in]. 
Of the two who stayed, Mai Joe was a cross-border trader who imported electrical goods from 
Botswana and used clothes from Mozambique and Zambia. She was offered a third-floor room (which 
she shared with six others) in a derelict council building. She paid US$50 a month for the former office. 
At the time of the study, she used the rented room as storage space because “that’s the only thing the 
place is good for”. She seemed quite content but indicated that she still spread her wings out by hiring 
people who sold her wares in various parts of the city. This was, of course, technically illegal and she 
had lost “a lot of goods and money” through confiscations and bribery. Baba Kundi, who remained at his 
new business site a year after being relocated, was easily the most law-abiding. Despite his reservations 
about integration, he dutifully operated at his allocated stand that he used for furniture manufacturing. 
He is the only one who fully adhered to the original terms of his licence. Explaining this exceptional 
case, Pepukai said, “It’s not like he has a choice. He can’t move around the city carrying Beds and Sofas 
on his head for sale, can he?” 
Debating integration 
Much can be said about integrating informality in urban Zimbabwe. It includes how various 
stakeholders define it, what they think its rationale is, and how it is executed in practice. One view looks 
at the positive side, the resulting benefits for the city and the informal businesses. It brings order to the 
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city and recognition for the informal businesses, as they are now free from harassment by the authorities. 
In addition, free riding is done away with as everyone pays his or her dues. In the end, integration is a 
win-win situation for the authorities, the city and the informality. Furthermore, professionals do not need 
to worry about what to do with a sector that operates outside the regulatory framework. 
 The other perspective, which is encapsulated in the views of the majority of informal business 
practitioners and activists, emphasises the dark side of integration. In this perspective, integration is 
interpreted as a war on informality. This standpoint focuses on what is seen as an obsession with 
regulation, modernization and spatial order. In this view, while it is true that in terms of definition and 
rationale there seems to be “some flashes of light and hope for informality” (Ms U), the odds are heavily 
stacked against informals from the outset.  
The reasons, practices and outcomes of integration are thus highly contested. This is not helped 
by the divergence of views between planners and their fellow bureaucrats on one hand, and the activists 
and most of the operators on the other. The majority of the operators and their activist allies hold onto a 
welfarist conception of integration. To these ones, integration entails being accorded respect, protection 
and material assistance. However, listening to them, it is clear that their experiences and encounters with 
state agencies in clean-up campaigns and integration practices have engendered seemingly incurable 
scepticism about the intentions of the authorities and persistent trepidation about their methods. This is 
the case whether it is the spatialized violence of clean-up operations or the insidiousness of integration 
as seen in forced relocation and the levying of various charges. To them, the “suffocating, oppressive 
order” (Mr S), and the ferocious modernising logic that is behind the spatialized violence visited upon 
them by the authorities during clean-up operations, seems to be the same logic that is behind integration.  
It seems the scepticism, trepidation and uneasiness are not without substance. From definition to 
rationale to execution, it appears the views of those tasked with proposing, designing and implementing 
“integration”, “inclusion”, “mainstreaming” or whatever the state-centred practice might be 
authoritatively labelled, espouse a technicist, economistic, and legalistic logic. Simply put, it is seen an 
attempt to “reform and rationalize” informality (Foucault, 1997, 75).  Unsurprisingly, the 
professionalized conception of integration or inclusion is dismissed as war against informality. It is de-
informalization by another name—a forced conversion (Kamete, 2013a), which translates to eradication 
by assimilation.  There seems to be a feeling that what the authorities cannot achieve by clean-up 
campaigns, they seek to achieve by this pernicious integration. This is how the practitioners and activists 
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interpret what they see as an obsession with universal regulation, visibility, modernization, surveillance 
and order. To them, this is just one way of governing what has been judged as disorder. Rather than 
mainstreaming informality, integration appears to be a “method by which human behaviour is directed 
via a state administration” (Foucault, 1997, 77). 
Understandably, because integration is targeted at the Other in the form of the informal sector, it 
does not come without conditions. The Other’s difference is perceived to be incompatible with and a 
threat to the Same. Not that there is anything wrong with conditions per se. However, there seems to be 
something amiss when in an effort to make the Other less different, the conditions strip the Other of its 
other-ness.  A closer scrutiny of the terms of inclusion suggests that Zimbabwe’s state-directed form of 
integration amounts to pernicious assimilation that has “de-informalization” as its ultimate goal (Kamete, 
2013a). This is because integration appears to be no more than conditional inclusion where “inclusion” 
is based, simultaneously, on the shedding of key traits of informality and on mimicking features of 
formality. Hence, registration, licencing, relocation, legal tenancy, and the resultant reprieve from 
harassment, all too often are conditional upon losing the soul of informality.   
So it is that in state-directed integration itinerant traders are made to operate from fixed places 
with permanent structures. Those who operate on contested spaces such as public places, roadsides and 
shop-fronts are relocated to peripheral areas where, they argue, business is non-existent. As baba Kundi 
complained, operators who have established a base and a loyal clientele in given locales are moved into 
“ill-equipped, poorly located and crowded market places where we are practically invisible and 
competition is rife”. Vendors and traders who operate after hours are forced to conform to the official 
working day. Entry and operational costs, which have hitherto been low, are increased through “arbitrary 
and exorbitant licencing and registration fees” (Mr T) as well as the cost of complying with a battery of 
planning, environmental and public health codes. Regular fixed taxes and rentals are imposed on people 
whose revenue flows, are at best irregular and unpredictable. Seen in this light, compliance with these 
conditions means an end to that which makes informality a ubiquitous, supple and easily accessible 
livelihood option.  
The authorities’ offer is unambiguous: Strip away the offending traits of informality and adopt 
approved traits of formality and you will be co-opted. Only if they comply with these conditions are 
informals afforded the opportunity to be plucked from what Agamben (1998, 6) terms “the zone of … 
indistinction” and perhaps become citizens. The problem here is that it is those offending traits of 
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informality that enable these businesses to exist, to be accessible to the less privileged, to be resilient and 
and/or to flourish (Hart 1970; 1973; Trip, 1997; UN-Habitat, 2009).  Arguably, in urban Zimbabwe, 
shedding these traits and adopting the favoured characteristics of formality could result in a suicidal 
transmogrification of informal businesses into the country’s ill-fated small-scale enterprises, which have 
never taken off despite numerous attempts (Kamete, 2004).  In views of the foregoing, this conditional 
integration could be interpreted as “incorporation on particularly disadvantageous terms” (Nevile, 2007, 
249). It seems this is not a simple give-and-take. It involves some crippling Faustian bargains. It is a 
hostile assimilation requiring the liquidation of any qualities incompatible with the authorities’ modernist 
ideology and the simultaneous imposition of an operational monopoly. 
Pernicious Assimilation in Southern Africa 
In southern Africa, Zimbabwe is not unique in pursuing a pernicious form of integration. I will 
look at integration in Namibia, South Africa and Botswana. In Namibia the handling of informality in 
the capital, Windhoek, has all the hallmarks of hostile assimilation. To their credit, the authorities in 
Windhoek have demonstrated some degree of sensitivity to the diversity of the informal economy. The 
licencing regulations provide for the registration of a variety of informal enterprises including “market 
informal trader, … fixed informal trader, … roaming informal trader … [and] temporary informal trader” 
(Namibia, 2007). However, it seems, even this integration has its waste products. In February 2011, the 
City Police removed vendors from informal markets, insisting that it would continue its “operation of 
cracking down on any unregistered vendors” (Kazondovi, 2011). The authorities deployed legalistic 
planning arguments to rationalize their actions. The vendors had to go because they were not operating 
in properly designated places. Thus, for all its flexibility, this is inclusion on disadvantageous terms 
entailing Faustian bargains. The integrated businesses were forced to discard offending traits of 
informality while simultaneously adopting those of formal businesses in terms of licensing, registration, 
land occupation and use. Arguably, these prescriptions are intended to “de-informalize” their targets by 
remoulding them in the image of the formal city. Of the 74 traders evicted from the contested sites, 60 
were relocated to different “Community Markets”. Interestingly, the remaining 14 vendors did not come 
back for registration and could not be contacted (Kazondovi, 2011).  
South Africa has its own version of inclusion on disadvantageous terms. In official economic 
policy, discourse “the terms ‘informal sector’ and ‘informality’ have more or less disappeared” (Harrison 
et al., 2008, 227). This is what integration into the mainstream entails: selling out the very identity and 
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soul of informality. How else can one interpret the replacement of “informal business” with a term like 
“small business” and “the second economy” in economic policy? Remarkably, according to Harrison et 
al. (2008, 227), this is intended to “make … [informal businesses] more susceptible to enumeration, 
regulation and “development” into entities that conform more readily to a dominant modernist 
rationality”. It can be argued that this is pernicious assimilation at work. 
In Gaborone, Botswana, integration takes on, among other things, the form of involuntary 
relocation. Forced to spatially operate and behave like formal businesses, informals find themselves 
struggling to belong (Joseph, 2011; Menyah 2011). To belong they have to sacrifice key locational 
features such as street trading. The official ideology is that “prosperity can be attained only by promoting 
large-scale public and private economic enterprises” (Jimu, 2004, 19). Accordingly, integration means 
being remoulded in the image of these formal-sector businesses. The integrated informals have to comply 
with a land use zoning system that ignores them in land allocation, and development control mechanisms 
that are oblivious to their spatial needs (Joseph, 2011). Integration into such a framework is pernicious. 
Speaking about one market designed to accommodate integrated informals, Joseph observes that “the 
officially (poorly) zoned market area at Bontleng became unattractive to even the newest entrants shifting 
them towards areas of high concentration of people” (2011, 8). Like their counterparts in Zimbabwe, the 
authorities display a modernistic preoccupation with order and classification, where everything should 
be in its place (see Cresswell, 1996). Officially, “streets are perceived as an abode of vehicles and … the 
general sentiment is that ‘no business belongs to the streets’” (Jimu, 2004, 25). To this, we can add the 
official obsession with aspects like visibility and enumeration just like in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
For informals to be accepted into the mainstream, a sacrifice of sorts is demanded. Predictably, it entails 
stripping away key aspects of informality and mimicking those of modern businesses.  
So What Is the Alternative? 
It is not my intention to prescribe a recipe for handling informality. Instead of a prescription, I will offer 
the building blocks of alternatives, for there is no single alternative.  The study suggests that integration 
per se is not the contested issue. There is no doubt that properly managed, integration holds a lot of 
promise for the multitudes eking out a precarious living on contested urban spaces. By extension, this 
implies that a poorly conceived and badly executed form of integration has a dark side. 
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One of the major issues in this research is the divergence among stakeholder views regarding the 
implementation, understanding, motivation and interpretation of the practice.  There are two contrasting 
understandings here: a welfarist form of integration versus a technicist regulatory legalistic form of 
integration.  It is a divergence between livelihood and wellbeing on one hand and order and control on 
the other. The issue is not reducible to a choice between integration or letting things be – about inclusion 
and exclusion. Nor is it about a generalizable panacea.  There is no—and should not be any—one-size-
fits-all approach. There is no one “best” alternative “out there” waiting to be discovered.  
Nevertheless, there is danger in “framing problems in terms amenable to technical solutions” (Li, 
2007, 2), as is currently the case.  An overhaul is needed. The political rationalities and technologies of 
government need to be re-evaluated, as should the kind of subjects the authorities are trying to make. As 
shown in the interviews, integration as inclusion can work and bring benefits for some enterprises in 
some places at some times. However, like all state-directed projects, it does not work for everyone, 
everywhere, at all times. Thus, modernity’s fixation with progress and order are hardly the right place to 
begin.  
It has been shown that informality is primarily a necessity-driven activity. None of the people 
who participated in the study had made a rational choice by voluntarily exiting the formal sector to 
heroically escape burdensome controls (Perry et al, 2007). This rules out eradication as a strategy of 
handling informality. Eradication is a corollary of state-directed integration. This form of technicized 
integration has waste products: people and activities that cannot be assimilated because they are deemed 
to be beyond redemption or like Jimmy cannot afford the cost. Similarly, integration in the form of 
unilateral dislocation without agreed relocation is pernicious and has not worked (Kamete, 2013a).  
Be that as it may, the quest for a universal remedy to exclusion and pernicious integration is 
neither possible nor desirable. The choice of a strategy should depend on context. Even in the same town 
or city, contexts differ socially, spatially and temporally. Context includes among other things, the type 
of informal activity, the place, the time, and the people involved. Understanding and accommodating 
specific informalities and their social, spatial, temporal, economic and operational traits is the key to 
stripping state-directed integration of its perniciousness. This means more than ditching generalized and 
generalizable notions, prejudices and built-in preconceptions about informality. It means understanding 
what is really going on. This in turn entails revisiting the expert-centred approaches to government. The 
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resultant radical approaches will require ‘de-technicizing’ the framing of informality and embracing 
other knowledges and other ways of knowing.   
Conclusion 
The integration of the informal sector is part of the preoccupation of the “art of government”. As 
an expression of governmental rationality, this integration is “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide 
or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (Gordon, 1991, 2), who in this case are those involved 
in informal businesses. Naturally, in southern Africa, as elsewhere, the state’s bid to govern cities has as 
its object the government of the economy, including the informal sector. This “conduct of conduct” is 
about political rationalities, which involve making reality knowable and calculable in such a way that it 
can be governed (Miller and Rose, 2008). It is hardly surprising that the state’s understanding of 
informality, as reflected by the utterances of its professionals, includes notions of visibility to enhance 
predictability and facilitate the application of technologies of control to tame informality. This explains 
the heavy slant towards “planned-ness” and spatialized order among the bureaucrats. The integrated 
businesses are forced to conform to the precepts of planning’s “abstract space” (Lefebvre, 1991). Perhaps 
predictably, once integration becomes a state-directed programme, it cannot escape the “multiplicity of 
endeavours to rationalize the nature, mechanisms, aims, and parameters of governmental authority” 
(Inda, 2005, 8). 
Little wonder that integration, for all its potential and populist appeal, is sometimes caught up in 
pernicious technologies of government. When government takes on a technological and pragmatic form 
it unavoidably sanctifies, elevates and prioritises technical solutions to every issue (Kamete, 2013b). 
What we witness here is the “relationship between government and knowledge through which governing 
activities are recast as non-political and nonideological problems that need technical solutions” (Ong, 
2006, 3). It is this technicization that results in “integration” becoming pernicious assimilation, 
reinforcing the gulf between the interpretations and expectation of, on the one hand, those in the informal 
sector and their sympathizers, and on the other, the state and its functionaries. So it is that in state-directed 
integration modernization has trumped welfare.  In the case of Zimbabwe, the extension of an ill-fitting 
regulatory framework characterised by forced relocation and the levying of a multiplicity of charges, has 
become the overriding concern in the single-minded pursuit of what has become a thoroughly 
“governmentalized” notion. Consequently, integration has become a sanitised term for normalization and 
de-informalization (Kamete, 2013a; 2013b). 
 25 
For all its noble intentions, the integration of the informal sector into the mainstream urban 
economy appears to suffer from some maladies that mar many professionalized state programmes that 
are tethered to technicistic, legalistic and economistic ideals. Thanks to some subtle “goal displacement” 
so typical of public bureaucracies (see Merton, 1957) that are tasked with operationalising it, integration 
is stripped of that which could make it acceptable and beneficial to the people who are supposed to be 
“integrated”. As noted by Warner and Havens (1968, 539), goal displacement happens when “the major 
goals claimed by the organization are neglected in favour of goals associated with building or maintaining 
the organization”. This makes bureaucracies fertile ground for the bastardization of seemingly reasonable 
concepts which end up failing to represent the values and qualities that which they are intended (or 
purported) to represent. Thus, as has happened in the preceding cases, integration is reduced to a 
technicized, depoliticized and legalistic notion that is insensitive to the local context and the needs of the 
putative beneficiaries. 
Unsurprisingly, the result is a chasm between, on the one hand, the understandings and practices 
of the state represented by its learned bureaucrats, and on the other, the expectations and interpretations 
of informal businesses operators and their activist sympathizers. It is this gulf that has generated 
scepticism and distrust of the state’s intentions and methods. It is this rift that has contributed to 
widespread resistance to the bastardized integration, inclusion and mainstreaming, which on closer 
inspection are no more than pernicious assimilation—a malicious form of inclusion that is ultimately 
geared towards domesticating the Other. 
 
Endnotes
1 In this part, I look at three perspectives. I will not discuss the post-modernist perspective, as it does not apply to informality 
in the contexts that I am focusing on. For a useful summary of these perspectives, see Williams and Lansky (2013), and 
Williams and Gurtoo (2012). 
2 For a detailed discussion of these strategies and policies, see Kamete (2013a). 
3 For details on all interviews, see Table 1. 
4 At the time of the study (2010), the application to acquire a hawker’s license required a US$20 fee. If the application was 
approved, the license itself cost US$120 and was valid for one year. The operators in the study earned between US$2 and 
US$7 a day, averaging about US$3.50 for each operator per day. 
5 At the time of the study, the average rental for operators interviewed was $25 per stand per month. 
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6 In the 2011 budget, the Minister of Finance outlined plans to use local authorities to collect taxes for the government and 
keep 10 per cent for themselves. At the time of writing, the proposal was yet to be implemented. 
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